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NOTES
Third Party Access to Data Obtained via Remote
Sensing: International Legal Theory versus
Economic and Political Reality
by David A. Greenburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
R emote sensing by satellite, a product of the union of advances in
space technology and the computer-fueled information explosion, rep-
resents both a great step forward in man's ability to learn about his
planet, and in the formation of a "new information transfer process."'
Remote sensing has been defined as a "system of methods for identifying
the nature and for determining the condition of objects on the earth's
surface and of phenomena on, below or above it, by means of observations
from airborne or spaceborne platforms." 2
This Note is concerned with remote sensing by satellite, as con-
trasted with other varieties of sensing such as direct human observation
and measurement, and high altitude aerial photography. Several unique
properties of remote sensing by satellite distinguish it from earlier meth-
ods. These include the capacity to operate the system easily once it is
*Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. (1983).
Ambrosetti, The Relevance of Remote Sensing to Third-World Economic Develop-
ment: Some Legal And Political Aspects, 12 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & PoL. 569, 590 (1980), citing
Stoebner, Remote Sensing of Earth Resources: Technique and Law, in LEGAL IMPLCATiONS
OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 33, 37-38 (N. MATTE & H. DESAUSSURE EDS.
1976)[LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE is cited hereinafter as
Matte & DeSaussure].
2 Magdel6nat, The Major Issues in the "Agreed" Principles on Remote Sensing, 9 J.
SPACE L. 111 (1981), citing U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/98] (1972).
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established, to observe other lands without intruding into adjacent coun-
tries or their airspace, to sample very large areas in a single scene, to
produce an enormous flow of data in digital form for computer process-
ing,$ and to monitor dynamic changes in the earth's surface.4
Since the United States launched the world's first civilian remote
sensing satellite (ERTS-1, now renamed LANDSAT 1) in 1972, the appli-
cations and potential uses for remote sensing have been greatly expanded.
Data obtained from remote sensing satellites has proven useful in assess-
ing and meeting needs for transportation, food, water,5 geology and min-
eral resources,6 oceanography and marine resources,7 land management
and forestry, civil engineering, cartography, coastal zone management,
pollution monitoring and weather and natural disaster information.9
With the rapid growth of technology 10 and the realization that the re-
sources of this planet are limited, it has become clear that remote sensing
has enormous potential in the above applications as well as others yet to
be discovered. There is little doubt that the application of space technol-
ogy such as remote sensing can lead to faster economic growth and devel-
opment."' Space technology provides a way of leap-frogging obsolete tech-
nologies while retreating from percolation and trickle-down models of
development for which developing countries do not have the time.12 The
3 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PuB. No. STI-177, CIVLAN
SPACE POLICY AND APPLICATIONS 53 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SPACE POLICY].
4 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 571. This ability is a result of the satellite's capability for
repeated coverage of a given area of the earth's surface for an extended period of time.
5 UNISPACE 82 News, no. 2, Dec. 1981, at 1. Transportation applications include
route planning and construction; food applications include the collection of information per-
taining to crops and livestock; water related applications include monitoring surface water
and aiding in the search for subsurface water. The development during the 1980's of sensors
capable of monitoring soil moisture could become an important contribution to the efficient
use of water resources.
6 Magdelbnat, supra note 2, at 112.
7 Id.
a SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 55.
9 Mossinghoff & Fuqua, United Nations Principles on Remote Sensing: Report on De-
velopments, 1970-1980, 8 J. SPACE L. 103 (1980). See also Doyle, Remote Sensing by Satel-
lite: Technical and Operational Implications for International Cooperation in Matte &
DeSaussure, supra note 1, at 8-9, for discussion of the benefits and problem solving capabili-
ties of remote sensing.
10 See generally Chapter 1 of UNISPACE 82 Report, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 101/10]
(1982)[hereinafter cited as UNISPACE 82].
11 U.N. Doc. A/Conf./101/PC/L17/Add.mI at 12 (1981).
11 UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 4-5. Other applications of space technology have
already shown how less-developed countries can "leap-frog" technology. For example, com-
munications satellites such as those operated by INTELSAT have enabled countries with
the most rudimentary internal communications systems largely to leap-frog the wire and
microwave stages of communications development and use satellites and their associated
ground stations for both international and domestic uses.
Vol. 15:361
real benefits of remote sensing come not only from the making and
launching of the satellites, or collecting and receiving data, and not even
from the processing and analysis of data, but also from the practical use
of the analyzed data.13
As might be expected, there are many legal obstacles to the success-
ful operation of remote sensing systems on any scale. These obstacles
stem from the compelling reality of remote sensing: it is now possible to
observe vast areas of the globe, and the results of such sensing are often
applicable to problems of either a regional or a global nature. The flip
side of this reality is that many nations view key aspects of the remote
sensing process as violative of their sovereignty." This is not surprising in
view of the developmental and technological inequality existing today be-
tween the developed and developing nations."'
The United Nations' active concern with remote sensing began with
the 1969 U.N. Conference on Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. 6 Since that time, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) has actively pursued the issues stemming from remote sensing
by satellite.17 COPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee, as well as its Scien-
tific and Technical Subcommittee, have achieved significant progress in
drafting and reaching consensus on several important principles for regu-
lating remote sensing.1 8 The one area where virtually no progress has
been made is the right of a third party state, organization or individual to
have access to data obtained by a state which has "sensed" a second
state. This question concerning the right to disseminate data to third par-ties is so explosive that, in 1979, the Legal Subcommittee did not discuss
it in order to avoid useless lengthy discussions. " This tension is due to
strong and widely divergent views held by member nations as to whether,
and under what circumstances, third parties should have access to such
data.20 The purpose of this Note is to explore these views and their im-
pact on the third party access issue.
13 Id. at 2.
1" See Joint Proposal of Argentina and Brazil on Draft; Basic Articles for a Treaty on
Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by Means of Technology, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1047]
(1974)[hereinafter cited as Argentina-Brazil Proposal].
15 See UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 3.
16 J. KAY, THE LEGAL IMPLCATIONS OF REMoTE SENSING BY SATELLrrE 47 (1981), pre-
pared by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, for the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
17 Mossinghoff & Fuqua, supra note 9, at 113.
18 See Text of Draft Principles on Remote Sensing, contained in Report of the Legal
Subcommittee on the Work of its Twentieth Session, in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/305] Annex I,
app. § A (1982), and reproduced in the Appendix to this Note [hereinafter cited as
COPUOS Draft Principles].
19 Magdel6nat, supra note 2, at 113.
20 Id.
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II. ViEws REGARDING THIRD PARTY AcCESS TO DATA
In order to appreciate the significance and implications of the third
party access question, it is essential to understand the basic views ad-
vanced by member nations. These views may be broken down into three
positions: A) the open acquisition and dissemination position; B) the con-
sent regime requiring consent both to acquire data as well as disseminate
it; and C) the consent regime requiring consent only to disseminate the
data to third parties.
A. Open Dissemination
The open dissemination position advocates unrestricted dissemina-
tion of remotely sensed data collected over both the sensing state and
second states to all interested parties, including states, organizations and
individuals. 21 This position is espoused by the United States, and it is
perhaps best delineated in the Working Paper submitted in February
1975 to COPUOS.22
Article V of the draft agreement proposed in the Working Paper pro-
vides that all states receiving data directly shall make it available to all
interested parties.28 The wording of this provision makes the open dis-
semination requirement applicable to states operating ground stations for
the purpose of receiving data from remote sensing satellites, as well as the
state actually operating the satellite. Article VI provides that states re-
ceiving data shall make it available to the sensed nation no later than it is
made available to third parties.24 This provision protects the interests of
the sensed state.
The international consensus is that there is a need to distinguish be-
tween raw data obtained directly from the satellite (primary data), and
the end product resulting from the analytical processes performed on that
data (analyzed information).2 5 The U.S. position, while favoring the dis-
semination of both primary data and analyzed information, is that ana-
lyzed information is the property of the analyzer, and that therefore the
right of access to analyzed information cannot be equated with the right
of access to primary data.2 6
S Working Paper of the U.S., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L103 (1975).
22 Id.
23 Id. at Art. V.
24 Id. at Art. VI. Article I emphasizes that remote sensing will be conducted in accord
with international law, including various U.N. Treaties. Articles I, IV, VII and VII em-
phasize the need for international cooperation in the acquisition and interpretation of data
obtained through remote sensing.
25 COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18 at Principle I. See also Christol, Remote
Sensing and International Law, V ANNALS oF Am & SPACE L. 375, at 419 (1980).
26 J. KAY, supra note 16, at 17-18. The distinction is of indirect relevance to rights of
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The United States is recognized as the most ardent advocate of the
open dissemination policy.2 7 The United States maintains that a policy of
free collection and dissemination of primary data and analyzed informa-
tion is not only in accord with international law, but is necessitated by
the nondiscriminatory nature of the sensing equipment and its collection
process.2 8 Since the United States is presently the only state operating a
functional civilian remote sensing system,29 the U.S. policy is the current
rule regarding third party access. The United States regularly supplies
data to governments, organizations, businesses and individuals.3 0
Proponents of open dissemination find support in international cus-
tom and treaties, in particular the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.31 The
Outer Space Treaty provides in Article I that "exploration and use of
outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific devel-
opment, and shall be the province of all mankind. s3 2 Article I of the
Treaty provides that "States party to the treaty shall carry on activities
in the exploration and use of outer space... in accordance with interna-
tional law including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international
cooperation and understanding. 33 Article XII provides:
dissemination. Nations favoring a restrictive dissemination regime phrase their opposition
to open dissemination in terms linking such dissemination to the threat of alleged informa-
tion misuse. Thus no distinction is made between raw data and analyzed information for
purposes of dissemination, the one being as objectionable as the other.
27 The open dissemination policy, or "U.S. view" is supported by many other nations,
particularly those that are more industrialized. See Swedish National Paper for UNISPACE
82, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.101/NP/9 (1981); J. KAY, supra note 16, at 125, citing J. RiKHOF, AN
ALTERNATIVE REmoTE SENSING SATELLIrz SYsTEM, L.L.M. Thesis submitted to the Univer-
sity of Nymgen, Netherlands, May 1979 (revised edition).
Christol, supra note 25, at 395.
29 SPACE PoUcy, supra note 3, at 355. While it is a functioning world wide system, the
U.S. considers Landsat to be experimental.
" SPACE POLIcY, supra note 3, at 355.
31 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies, April 25, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.LA.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 2-5 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. While
some have argued that Art. 19 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights shows that interna-
tional law supports the right to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds and that
therefore an international regime of free and open dissemination accords with international
law, (see J. KAY, supra note 16, at 18-20; Robinson, For a Worldwide Utilization and Dis-
semination of Data Acquired Through Remote Sensing, in Matte & DeSaussure, supra note
1, at 113, 124) this argument is weak support for the open dissemination position of the U.S.
point of view because the U.S. is not a party to the Human Rights Declaration. See also
Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 580.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. L
" Id. at Art. I.
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To promote international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, States party to the treaty. . agree to inform the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and inter-
national scientific community to the greatest extent feasible and practi-
cable, of the nature, conduct, location and results of such activities."
Proponents of open dissemination interpret the treaty, particularly
Article XII, as encouraging nations to disseminate data.3 5 Those states
opposed to open dissemination argue that the Outer Space Treaty is in-
applicable to remote sensing"6 which, though accomplished in outer space,
is earth-oriented.87 Proponents contend, however, that at the time of the
Treaty's formulation, earth-oriented activities were plentiful and well
known, and therefore the Treaty contemplated activities such as remote
sensing.38 The international community has accepted the proposition that
the Outer Space Treaty governs the space segment of remote sensing,ss
which is the satellite's actual sensing activities occurring in space.'0 The
core of the dispute is the ground segment, 1 which encompasses activities
occurring on earth, including analysis and dissemination.
The U.S. delegation to COPUOS has argued that the free use princi-
ple contained in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty authorizes all remote
sensing in the areas above the vertical limits of territorial sovereignty,
subject only to the requirement that the contemplated use be peaceful in
nature. Further, any requirement of prior consent for the acquisition of
data by sensing is seen as conflicting with the free use principle.'2 The
U.S. Working Paper omits, and thus impliedly rejects, the concept of per-
manent sovereignty insofar as it might be invoked to restrict access to
data regarding the state's natural resources. 43 In essence, the United
States rejects the views that call for consent by the sensed nation before
34 Id. at Art. XII.
See, e.g., J. KAY, supra note 16, at 33.
86 See infra, at Sections B and C.
-1 See Diederiks-Verschoor, Observation Remote Sensing Satellites in Matte & De-
Saussure, supra note 1, at 69-70.
J. KAY, supra note 16, at 32.
39 COPUOS Draft Principle I, supra note 18.
40 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 569.
41 Some authorities, such as Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 569-70, divide the ground
segment into "ground" and "user" segments, the user segment being the distribution of and
final use of the information, and the ground segment being the reception and analysis of the
raw data. This Note will use "ground segment" in reference to the combined ground and
user segments.
42 D. Smith, International Law and Space Industrialization, contained in Appendix D
of 4 SPACE INDUSTRAMLIZATION, at 273 (1978) (Report prepared under contract with the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration by Rockwell International Corp., NASA-CR-
150723) [hereinafter cited as SPACE INDUSmAIZATION].
" Id. at 275.
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data may be either acquired" or disseminated.' 5 The U.S. Working Paper
stresses broad international participation in remote sensing activities of
the space powers, including technical assistance and regional cooperation.
The reasoning seems to be that the proposals rejecting open dissemina-
tion will only be defeated if the United States can demonstrate a strong
likelihood of significant benefit for countries adhering to the open dissem-
ination view.4
6
B. Prior Consent for Acquisition and Dissemination
In October, 1974, Argentina and Brazil introduced in COPUOS a
joint proposal requiring the prior consent of the sensed state for both the
acquisition and dissemination of data.47 The Argentine-Brazilian position
urges that remote sensing be based on the principle of sovereign equality
of states. This principle embraces the legal rights inherent in sovereignty,
including the economic freedom of a state to use and distribute its wealth
and thereby exercise its legitimate and exclusive sovereign rights over its
natural resources.4 The proposal further provides that states shall refrain
from remotely sensing resources belonging to other states without the
sensed state's consent.4'9 States which have consented to the remote sens-
ing of their territories are entitled to participate in the sensing activities
in a manner to be determined by specific arrangements between the par-
ties concerned.50 States which are the object of remote sensing activities
are entitled to full unrestricted access to all data obtained through those
activities.51
Articles IX and X of the Argentina-Brazil proposal contain the cru-
cial provisions for the purpose of this discussion. Under the proposal,
states obtaining information relating to the natural resources of another
state may not divulge or transfer it in any manner to a third state, inter-
national organization or private entity, without the express authority of
the sensed state. In addition, this information may not be used to the
" For the view that the nation being sensed must give consent before the sensing is to
occur, see Argentina-Brazil Proposal, supra note 14.
4For the view that the nation being sensed must give consent before data concerning
its territory may be disseminated, see Working Paper of France and USSR on Draft Princi-
ples Governing Activities of States in the Field of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources by
Means of Space Technology, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/133] (June 1974), Annex IV, at 9-10;
[hereinafter cited as France-USSR Proposal].
46 SPACE INDUSTRIALIATION, supra note 42, at 276. Indeed, benefits have already inured
to other nations. See generally SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 55-56; Doyle, supra note 9.
47Argentina-Brazil Proposal, supra note 14.
4 Id. at Article IV.
4, Id. at Article V.
Id. at Article VII.
51 Id. at Article VIII.
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detriment of the sensed state.52 The corollary is that the sensed state will
refrain from soliciting or accepting from third states, international organi-
zations or private entities any information regarding the natural resources
of another state obtained through remote sensing, without the express
consent of the state owning the resources.53
This proposal, the converse of the U.S. open dissemination position,
was originally supported by other Latin American members of COPUOS
including Mexico, Venezuela and Chile." The proposal represents the ex-
treme consent-oriented position, as it requires consent for the mere ac-
quisition of data by remote sensing. Under such a restrictive "second
party" access regime, third party access without consent would be out of
the question.
C. Prior Consent for Dissemination
Between the two positions discussed above lies the Joint Proposal of
France and the USSR, submitted to COPUOS in June 1974.55 This posi-
tion is currently favored by members of the Soviet block 6 and many of
the Third World nations.57 In addition, it shares with the Argentina-Bra-
zil Proposal the support of several other Third World nations, including
Egypt, Chad, Iran, Mongolia and Nigeria.58
Principle I of the proposal states that "outer space shall be free for
use by all States... in accordance with international law, including the
United Nations Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, for carrying
out remote sensing of earth resources for strictly peaceful purposes."' 9
This provision reads much like Provision I of the U.S. Working Paper 0
and Principle III of the current COPUOS Draft Principles.61 The key dif-
ference arises from the fact that the proponents of prior consent to dis-
82 Id. at Article IX.
5 Id. at Article X.
54 SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42, at 267. As will be seen infra, these positions
are subject to change.
8 France-USSR Proposal, supra note 45.
SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42, at 270.
57 See generally, Ambrosetti, supra note 1. Virtually all developing nations favor this
position and this was emphasized at UNISPACE by the Proposal submitted by Mexico on
behalf of the "Group of 77" (which now numbers 122), favoring a consent regime. See U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.101/L.3 (Aug. 20, 1982). The "Group of 77" is a group of Developing Nations
formed in the early 1960's to coordinate their position at UNCTAD, and which has become
the main negotiating body for developing countries in the North-South dialogue. See UNIS-
PACE 82: A CoNTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETITION. (Prepublication
Draft) 11-16-20 (1983)(available from the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment).
5 SPACE INDUSTRL IZATION, supra note 42, at 270.
1' France-USSR Proposal, supra note 45, at Principle I.
6 Working Paper of the U.S., supra note 21, at Art. I.
61 COPUOS Draft Principle I, supra note 18.
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seminate information, including France and the USSR, interpret the 1967
Outer Space Treaty as applying only to space-oriented activities occur-
ring in outer space.
6 2
Principle 2 of the France-USSR Working Paper states that:
Such use shall, in particular, respect the principle of the sovereignty of
States and especially the right of peoples and States to exercise perma-
nent sovereignty over their wealth and resources as a basic element of
their right to self-determination as well as their inalienable right to dis-
pose of their natural resources and of information concerning those
resources.
63
This statement, one of the fundamental tenets of the prior consent policy,
ties the undisputed "inalienable right of States to dispose of their natural
resources"" to the right to dispose of information 5 concerning those re-
sources. This latter right, violently disputed in COPUOS debates,66 is sig-
nificantly absent from the U.S. Working Paper.6 7 Even the Argentina-
Brazil Proposal does not extend the right to dispose of resources so far as
to encompass information pertaining to those resources."
Principle 4 of the France-USSR Working Paper provides that
"[States exploring] natural resources by means of space technology which
. . . [obtain] information on the natural resources of another State must
transmit such information to the latter State on mutually acceptable
terms." 69 The sensed state's right of access to information is thus recog-
nized, as it is in Article VII of the Argentina-Brazil Proposal,70 Provision
VI of the U.S. Working Paper 1 and COPUOS Draft Principle XHI.7
6 J. KAY, supra note 16, at 86.
6' France-USSR Proposal, supra note 45, at Principle H.
See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, GA.
Res. 3201, reprinted in 68 Am. J. IN'L L. 798 (1974).
"The France-USSR Proposal of 1974 was presented before the current data-analyzed
information distinction now found in COPUOS Draft Principle I was agreed upon. See
supra note 18. It was not until 1976 that the COPUOS Working Group sought to refine the
data/information distinction. U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/171], Annex 3, at 4 (1976). Thus the term
"information" in the Argentina-Brazil Proposal appears to include both "data" and ana-
lyzed "information" as the terms are used in COPUOS Draft Principle L
See generally, COPUOS Legal Subcommittee Reports from the past several years,
including U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/305] (1982); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/288] (1981); U.N. Doe. A/
AC.105/271] (1980); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240] (1979); U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/218] (1978);
[hereinafter cited as Legal Subcommittee Report for the appropriate year].
67 SPACE INDUSTmALZATION, supra note 42, at 275.
"Argentina-Brazil Proposal, supra note 14, at Article IV.
69 France-USSR Proposal, supra note 45, at Principle 4.
70 Argentina-Brazil Proposal, supra note 14, at Article VIIL
71 Working Paper of the U.S., supra note 21, at Art. VI.
7f COPUOS Draft Principle XII, supra note 18, at 10. However, note that COPUOS
Principle XII, while providing that the sensed state is entitled to primary data about itself,
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Principle 5(b) of the France-USSR Proposal addresses the third
party access issue directly, providing that states obtaining information re-
garding the resources of another state by remote sensing shall not make it
public without:
[t]he clearly expressed consent of the State to which the natural re-
sources belong or use it in any other manner to the detriment of such
State. Documentation resulting from remote sensing activities may not
be communicated to third parties, whether Governments, international
organizations or private persons, without the consent of the State whose
territory is affected. 3
This provision is comparable to Article IX of the Argentina-Brazil propo-
sal,74 but has no counterpart in the U.S. proposal. COPUOS Draft Princi-
ple XV contains a similar provision,"5 but it remains totally bracketed
(indicating lack of agreement), and is one of the most hotly contested
provisions of the COPUOS Draft.y It should be noted, however, that
Principle 5(c) of the France-USSR proposal makes an exception to Prin-
ciple 5(b) in the case of "information or natural disasters and phenomena
which can be detrimental to the environment in general." This provision
has no counterpart in the Argentina-Brazil Proposal, and is not required
in the U.S. Working Paper because of the open dissemination policy. A
principle similar to Principal 5(c) has been incorporated into COPUOS
Draft Principle VIII, although the term "natural disaster" as used in the
Draft Principle is "subject to further discussion. '77
The France-USSR proposal, by requiring consent to disseminate data
to third parties, has become the leading position paper of the nations
favoring a consent regime.78 Rather than requiring prior consent for ac-
quisition of data, the proposal implements the concept of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources by granting the sensed state the power to
deny dissemination of data to third parties. Although the USSR favors a
consent requirement for dissemination, it strongly opposes a prior con-
sent requirement to sense because it plans to expand activities in the field
of remote sensing, and does not want to be limited by restrictive treaty
provisions or principles.79 The USSR has even attempted privately to
persuade the United States to accept the prior consent position in order
remains in a state of flux regarding the applicability of this Principle to analyzed
information.
73 France-USSR Proposal, supra note 45, at Principle 5(b).
74 Argentina-Brazil Prop6sal, supra note 14, at Article IX.
75 COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18, at Article IX.
76 Magdel6net, supra note 2, at 117.
1 COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18, at 9.
78 SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42, at 270. See supra note 57.
79 Id. at 272.
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to ensure adoption of a regime that does not limit acquisition activities.8 0
Proponents of the France-USSR Proposal, while viewing the 1967
Outer Space Treaty as applicable only to the space segment of remote
sensing activities, argue that the ground segment is governed by princi-
ples of territorial sovereignty which apply not only to a state's wealth and
natural resources, but also to data concerning those resources.81
D. Summary of Views
In summary, the Open Dissemination position, espoused by the
United States, gives all nations the freedom to acquire data by remote
sensing without the consent of the sensed nation. Under this view, ac-
quired data may be freely disseminated to any third party without con-
sent of the sensed state; the only restriction is that data must be provided
to the sensed state before it is provided to any third parties.
The Argentina-Brazil Proposal takes the view that prior consent of
the sensed nation must be obtained both before the sensing is to occur,
and before the data may be disseminated to any third parties. This ap-
proach emphasizes the impact of remote sensing on earth-based activities
as well as the right of a state to exercise its sovereignty to protect earth-
based resources and activities.
2
The France-USSR Proposal, while not requiring consent in order to
sense, retains the requirement of obtaining the sensed nation's consent
before disseminating data to a third party. This position stresses perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources by stating that control over infor-
mation regarding resources is every state's inalienable right.
Beyond the obligatory incantations on international assistance and
cooperation, the only substantive principle shared by the three proposals
is recognition of the right of a sensed state to receive data about itself
from the sensing state.83 This basic concept has been incorporated into
COPUOS Draft Principle XII."
The above discussion has highlighted the three major international
views on remote sensing. The efforts of COPUOS to reach agreement on
principles governing the third party access question will now be examined
in light of these proposals.
80 Id.
81 J. KAY, supra note 16, at 86. See supra note 64.
" Christol, supra note 25, at 393.
83 Argentina-Brazil Proposal, supra note 14, at Art. VIII, France-USSR Proposal, supra
note 45, at Principle 4, Working Paper of the U.S., supra note 21, at Art. VI.
COPUOS Draft Principle, supra note 18, at 10.
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III. EFFORTS OF COPUOS TO RESOLVE THE THIRD PARTY ACCESS
QUESTION
The Outer Space Committee has been generally successful in at-
tempting to reach consensus on principles governing the use of remote
sensing. 5 The Committee has been particularly successful with regard to
the consensual principles, numbers II-X.ss However, while the sensed
state's right of access to data concerning itself has been incorporated into
COPUOS Principle XII, there has been disagreement on whether the
principle must be worded to provide that this right be agreed upon in
each case between the sensing and sensed states5 7 The premise that all
data collected over a state must be made available to it is supported by
the Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.s
In recent years, the Argentina-Brazil Proposal has not been strongly
supported in COPUOS debates,8 9 at least to the extent that it requires
consent for the acquisition of data. Many states are unconcerned or feel
that the latter issue is academic;90 recent Working Papers submitted by
Latin American nations, particularly Mexico and Colombia, imply the ac-
ceptance of a basic right to sense other nations without consent.91 It has
also been pointed out that a requirement of prior consent by the sensed
state before data may be acquired is both politically unrealistic9 2 and un-
enforceable.93 Also to be considered are the practical problems and vastly
increased expenses that would be incurred were such a requirement to
85 See generally 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, at Annex I.
" J. KAY, supra note 16, at 86. COPUOS Draft Principles II through X deal with inter-
national cooperation generally, the application of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the U.N.
Charter, the sharing of benefits and information pertaining to natural disasters and the en-
vironment, the desirability of notifying the U.N. Secretary General of remote sensing pro-
grams and the sharing of technological information. The brackets indicating disagreement
have been removed from these Principles with the exception of several instances where con-
sensus has not been reached on the choice of "shall" or "should." See COPUOS Draft Prin-
ciples, supra note 18, at Principles II, I, IV, V, VI, VII, IX.
87 See, e.g., USSR Working Papers WG/RS (1982)/WP.7-10, China Working Paper
WG/RS (1982)/WP.12, contained in 1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, An-
nex I, at 19-20.
UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 43.
89 Discussion of a consent requirement for acquisition has been noticeably absent from
recent Legal Subcommittee Reports.
90 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REsouRcE SENSING FROM SPACE: PROsPEcrS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRImS 146 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REsoURcE SENSING].
91 See, e.g., Mexico Working Paper WG/RS (1981)/WP.2, Colombia Working Paper
WG/RS (1981)/WP.1, contained in 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, at 12-
16.
,2 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 575.
93 Bordunov, Legal Problems of Use the Data of Remote Sensing, [sic] reprinted in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIX COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, at 241.
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exist."' Thus, as regards the third party access question, the two currently
viable views are the Open Dissemination Position represented by the U.S.
Working Paper, and the Prior Consent (for dissemination) Position, rep-
resented by the France-USSR Proposal.
In dealing with the third party access question, COPUOS has con-
centrated on Draft Principles XIV, XV and XVI 5 These Principles cur-
rently contain numerous brackets indicating lack of consensus. There has
been little progress toward consensus since these Principles were
introduced.9 6
Principle XIV, which requires consultation between the sensed and
sensing states at the request of the sensed state, has been the subject of
minimal discussion in recent years. Some delegations have felt that the
ideas contained in Principle XIV are similar to those of Principle IV, and
therefore that the former could be deleted, or at least that its language
could be streamlined.9 7 Other delegations feel it is premature to decide
upon the language of Principle XIV until Principle XV has been agreed
upon. 8 Principle XIV was not discussed at the Legal Subcommittee's
Twenty-first session in 1982.91
Principle XV is at the heart of the third party access issue. Principle
XV first appeared in 1978 as Principle XIV.100 Other than having its des-
ignation changed to XV in 1979,101 there has been no change in the word-
ing of the Principle.10 2 As presently worded, Principle XV adopts the
stance of the France-USSR Proposal, requiring the consent of the sensed
state before data or information derived from remote sensing may be dis-
seminated to a third party. However, the entire Principle remains in
brackets. 10 3 Discussion of the Principle by the Legal Subcommittee has
brought out the diametrically opposed views of those states favoring open
dissemination and those favoring a consent requirement. ° 4 Those sup-
porting free dissemination have relied on the concept of freedom of explo-
ration and use of outer space as set out in the 1967 Outer Space
SPACE INDUSTRMLIZATION, supra note 42, at 293.
See, e.g., 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 3-5.
Compare the current wording of COPUOS Draft Principles XIV, XV, XVI, supra
note 18, at 7-11, with the wording of the Principles contained in the 1978 Legal Subcommit-
tee Report, supra note 66, Annex III, at 5-8. Note that at that time, what is now XVI was
XII, what is now XV was XVI, and what is now XIV was XV.
* 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 3-4.
98 Id.
1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
100 1978 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 8.
101 1979 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 11.
102 1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 11.
103 Id. at 5.
J1 . KAY, supra note 16, at 85.
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Treaty.105 Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty requires states to inform
the U.N. Secretary General, the public and the international scientific
community, of the nature and results of outer space activities con-
ducted. 06 In addition, proponents of open dissemination have argued
that restrictions will impair the development of remote sensing pro-
grams.10 7 Those states opposed to open dissemination respond with the
argument that the 1967 Treaty applies only to the space segment, and
that information pertaining to those resources obtained from the ground
segment should be governed by principles of territorial sovereignty appli-
cable to a state's wealth and resources, as discussed above.'08
At the 1980 session, proponents of open dissemination pointed out
that, absent provisions restricting sensing itself, the sensing states will
have data pertaining to the sensed states regardless of any restrictions on
dissemination to third parties, and that, in addition, mandatory restric-
tions on dissemination would result in administrative, financial and tech-
nical burdens on the development of remote sensing programs."0 9 On the
other hand, proponents of a consent regime countered with the argument
that certain types of data could be used to the detriment of the sensed
state.1 0 Many of the states favoring a consent regime have voiced support
for a Soviet proposal originally introduced in 1979."' This proposal uses
spatial resolution as the criteria for classification of data." 2 The proposal
suggests that sensed states can declare that dissemination of data per-
taining to their natural resources having a spatial resolution of less than
50 meters shall require the consent of the sensed state. The proposal en-
compasses analyzed information based on data with a resolution of less
than 50 meters as well."' While the Soviets justified this proposal on
grounds that dissemination of data with a resolution finer than 50 meters
could be detrimental to both the economic and defense interests of the
sensed state, the real Soviet concern lies primarily with the latter consid-
105 Id. at 86.
10 Id.
107 1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
108 COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18, at 9.
109 1980 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66.
110 Id.
2 USSR Working Paper WG Il (1979)/WP.1/Rev.1, contained in 1979 Legal Subcom-
mittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 12-13, Annex IV, at 1.
112 1979 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 12-13, Annex II, at 1.
Spatial resolution, as defined by the USSR, is the smallest size of an object that can still be
seen on a photograph. Thus, under the proposed standard limiting resolution to 50m, data
containing visible objects of under 50m would require the consent of the sensed state before
dissemination could occur. See 1978 Scientific and Technical Subcommittee Report U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/216], at 7.
11 See supra note 110.
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eration and the potential for dissemination of military secrets.11 4 The So-
viet proposal offers potential for compromise. If states allow the free dis-
semination of data with a resolution of greater than 50 meters, it may
provide a basis for reaching consensus. However, the proponents of open
dissemination feel that notwithstanding their objection in principle to
such a regime, spatial resolution would not provide a reliable standard of
reference for the classification of data because of the difficulty of estab-
lishing the actual resolution in each instance. 1 5 Some open dissemination
proponents argue that there are no objective, scientific or technical rea-
sons for classifying primary data in some rigid fashion into categories
which would be subjected to different dissemination rules, and that ad-
ding the criteria of spatial resolution to the consent regime proposal
would compound the practical problems with such a regime.116
At the 1981 session, proponents of open dissemination argued that
Principle XV should be excluded, reiterating the claims that open dis-
semination is in the best interest of all states, and that the Soviet spatial
resolution proposal would be an unreliable standard for classification. 1 7
Those states favoring a consent regime voiced their continued support for
the Soviet spatial resolution standard as an objective standard.118 Some
delegations favored a consent requirement for the dissemination of data
that could harm the sensed state, specifically data regarding harvests and
crop yield, but agreed that data beneficial to all should be freely dissemi-
nated. 119 Proponents of open dissemination countered that an open dis-
semination regime was superior even with regard to data pertaining to
crop yield, because attempts to conceal such data could be used to manip-
ulate markets unfairly. Open dissemination proponents further argued
that under a consent regime some states will have more data than others,
giving them an advantage over states not in possession of the data.1 20
Some delegations believed that since only a few states presently have ac-
cess to remote sensing data, or are in a position to analyze it themselves,
those without access (particularly lesser-developed countries) would be at
a clear disadvantage if data pertaining to their natural resources was
freely disseminated.' 2' These delegations indicated that in the future,
with a greater number of states participating, unrestricted dissemination
See generally 1979, 1981, 1982 Legal Subcommittee Reports, supra note 66.
116 1980 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66.
116 Id.
117 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 4.
8 Id.
119 Id. at 12. Colombia Working Paper WG/RS (1981)/WP.1 [hereinafter cited as Co-
lombian Proposal].
120 Colombian Proposal, supra note 119.
.1 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
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could become a possibility. 122
Dissatisfied with the Soviet spatial resolution proposal and the lan-
guage of Principle XV, the Colombian delegation introduced a new pro-
posal123 to modify the existing Principles I and XV. Under the Colombian
proposal, data on the earth and its natural phenomena are termed macro-
scopic remote sensing, and their dissemination may not be restricted, "in-
asmuch as the international community benefits from it." 124 Similar infor-
mation with much greater resolution, collected by airborne platforms or
other aeronautical or ballistic devices operating at any altitude "up to the
point at which outer space commences" is termed microscopic remote
sensing, and such data would require the sensed state's consent for dis-
semination. 125 Thus, under the Colombian proposal for Principle XV, no
state or entity carrying out remote sensing, or which analyzes data, could
on any account "communicate to third parties information on specific
natural resources or agricultural crops in any other state" without ob-
taining the prior consent of the sensed state. 2'
The delegations favoring open dissemination found the Colombian
Proposal unacceptable. Other delegations, while favoring the thrust of the
proposal, felt that the introduction of new concepts such as "agricultural
crops" would create difficulties in application of Principle XV.' 27 Due to
the lack of consensus, the language of Principle XV was left un-
changed. 128 The Colombian Proposal is nevertheless a step forward in the
resolution of the third party access question simply because it addresses,
more directly than prior proposals, the real reason for much of the
world's opposition to open dissemination, i.e., fear of exploitation through
dissemination of data pertaining to matters over which the sensed state
has no control."2
9
At the 1982 session, the proponents of open dissemination asserted
that open dissemination comported with international law, and that re-
strictions were impractical and would interfere with the development of
remote sensing programs. Some of these delegations pointed out that
there have been no actual claims of damage arising from dissemination,
that it is beneficial to all states, and that restrictions would discourage
international cooperation and participation in remote sensing programs.
They were also concerned that restrictions on dissemination would put
sensing states at an increasing advantage, enabling them to have or ac-
12 Id.
1 Colombian Proposal, supra note 119.
1:24 Id. at Principle I, provision 1.
125 Id. at provision 2.
2116 Id. at Principle XV.
127 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
128 Id.
129 See infra section D.
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quire data relating to all states. In addition, some delegations held the
view that wide dissemination of data and analyzed information is accept-
able only if the correlative obligation is established for sensing states to
provide, on a non-discriminatory basis, data and analyzed information to
all those requesting it.130
Advocates of a consent requirement reaffirmed views expressed at
previous sessions, stating that certain restrictions on dissemination were
necessary to protect the national interests of sensed states. Some delega-
tions felt that dissemination without the prior approval of the sensed
state violated the sovereignty of that state. Others felt that while wide
dissemination was desirable, a sensing state should be held responsible
for the dissemination of any primary data or analyzed information that
might adversely affect the national interests of a sensed state.131 The So-
viet Union reintroduced its proposal based on spatial resolution as a
means of classification,13 2 and once again the proposal received the sup-
port of many states favoring a consent regime. Some delegations, while
admitting that only the wide dissemination of primary data and analyzed
information could contribute to the development of states, considered it
essential that dissemination in certain instances be subject to the prior
approval of the sensed state. These states felt that an objective criterion
such as the degree of resolution should make it possible to distinguish
between that data which could be freely disseminated, and that which
requires prior consent. According to these delegations, any solution must
take into account existing technical realities, the importance and expan-
sion of international cooperation in this field and the "legitimate aspira-
tion of sensed States to control the dissemination of certain data to third
parties." 133
The discussion of Principle XVI, which requires that remote sensing
be conducted with respect for the full and permanent sovereignty of all
states and peoples over their own wealth and natural resources, has cen-
tered on whether the concept of sovereignty should be extended to infor-
mation pertaining to natural resources.1 The current wording of the
Principle, while not defining sovereignty as encompassing such informa-
tion, nevertheless provides that remote sensing be conducted with "due
regard to the rights and interests of other States and their natural and
juridical persons. . . as well as their inalienable right to dispose of their
180 1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
231 Id.
z2 USSR Working Paper WG/RS (1982)/WP.4 contained in 1982 Legal Subcommittee
Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 18.
1 1982 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 6.
4 See, e.g., 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex 1, at 5.
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natural resources, and of information concerning those resources." 13 5
Since its introduction in 1978,136 this principle has been the subject of hot
debate. Some delegations have been of the opinion that Principle XVI is
a natural complement to Principles XII and XV,1 while others have fa-
vored its deletion on the grounds that its meaning is not clear, and that
the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources had been
discussed in various other fora without reaching consensus."" In addition,
there has been ongoing disagreement as to the necessity of the reference
to "natural and juridical persons."1 9 Recently, some delegations have as-
serted that the principle of freedom of use of outer space must be linked
with the concept of state sovereignty over natural resources. 4 0 Other
states, favoring open dissemination have agreed that permanent sover-
eignty extends to a states' wealth and natural resources, but have reaf-
firmed that such sovereignty does not extend to information about wealth
and natural resources, and that consensus on Principle XVI was not pos-
sible, and that it should therefore be deleted. Some delegations have
stated that the concept of Principle XVI might be placed in the frame-
work of a preamble to the principles since consensus on its substance
seems unlikely.141 Thus progress on Principle XVI has been negligible
even when compared to Principle XV.
A. Evaluation of COPUOS and the Legal Subcommittee
COPUOS has been concerned with remote sensing since 1968.142 The
Working Group on remote sensing of COPUOS' Legal Subcommittee has
been attempting to draft principles on remote sensing since 1975.143
While some consensus has been reached in other areas, the critical issues
of third party access and extension of sovereignty have not come much
closer to resolution, despite the efforts of COPUOS. While this discussion
has gone on, there has been phenomenal progress in the areas of satellite
technology and data processing capabilities. 14 Lesser-developed nations
are clamoring for inclusion in the exploitation of high technology. By the
end of this decade, there are likely to be at least six operational remote
18 COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18.
18 Introduced as COPUOS Draft Principle XII; see 1978 Legal Subcommittee Report,
supra note 66, Annex I, at 8.
137 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note 66, Annex I, at 5.
188 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 6.
141 Id.
142 J. KAY, supra note 16, at 49.
143 Mossinghoff & Fuqua, supra note 9, at 108.
141 UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 23-26.
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sensing systems in use.145 The high technology nations are pushing tech-
nological horizons outward at an increasing pace. For example, the
French SPOT system, expected to be operational in 1984, will have a
multi-spectral (color) resolution of 20 meters, and panchromatic (black
and white) resolution of 10 meters,"" as contrasted with a multi-spectral
resolution of 80 meters, and a resolution of 30 meters for the black and
white system used presently in the U.S. Landsat system.1 47 Clearly, it is
essential that the development of a regulatory regime for remote sensing
keep up with both the growth of technology and the realities of world
politics, particularly in response to the concerns of the lesser-developed
nations. The issues will not resolve themselves, and based on the past
attempts, it is questionable whether COPUOS can keep up with the tech-
nological and political advances occurring in this decade as it strives to
develop consensus on principles governing remote sensing.
B. Economic and Political Realities
Although the lesser-developed nations appreciate the enormous po-
tential of remote sensing,1 4 S they view the resulting data as best kept
away from third parties (barring consent to disseminate). 49 Some nations
favoring prior consent for dissemination cite national legislation defining
certain categories of resource information as privileged governmental
matter.1 50 Others favor prior consent because they consider images of
their natural resources tantamount to strategic information.5
The primary fear of the lesser-developed nations, virtually all of
whom favor restrictions on dissemination, 52 is exploitation. Specifically,
they fear large international monopolies acquiring primary data and ana-
lyzed information, and using it for purposes of prognosis in different
branches of the world economy, thus determining the most profitable
fields of capital investment, and dictating their own conditions for natu-
ral resource development.1 5 3 While it is argued that since remote sensing
encompasses only data gathering and that access to and control of re-
sources can still be restricted by domestic legislation, lesser-developed na-
tions reject this argument because it does not take into account the value
"I' Id. at 24. The Landsat System is still considered to be experimental rather than
operational.
4I AvATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 11, 1982, at 98.
147 SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 189.
148 See, e.g., SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 5861.
148 See supra note 27.
110 RESOURCE SENSING, supra note 90, at 146.
251 Id.
"I J. KAY, supra note 16, at 125.
153 Bordunov, supra note 93, at 242.
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of the data and information itself in the hands of sophisticated govern-
ment and non-government entities in developed countries. Such data and
information would put those entities in a much superior bargaining posi-
tion.15' A similar concern is also reflected in the support for proposals of
the USSR to restrict dissemination based on a criterion of resolution. In
the view of some, the proposals of the USSR are designed to restrict the
usefulness of western remote sensing systems, as well as to limit the dis-
semination of potentially damaging information about the USSR and her
allies.155 Further, lesser-developed nations feel that the free access idea is
against their interests because it does not take into account the lesser-
developed nations' lack of the technology necessary to analyze the raw
data.156 As a result, many lesser-developed countries fear that the inter-
nationalization of data about their countries would result from open dis-
semination or from the use of regional data banks.1 57 These countries
view the makeup and condition of their natural resources to be private
national matters for security and economic reasons.158
It would seem that history dictates this position of the lesser-devel-
oped countries. This fear of internationalization and a desire for "pri-
vacy" regarding natural resources should not be unexpected since many
of the nations favoring a consent regime 59 have been colonized, exploited
and manipulated by the developed nations for many years.60 These coun-
tries are now being forced to consider a proposed international regime
based on their former exploiters' interpretations of international law
which dictate particular rules governing dissemination. This international
law is often based upon the custom and usage of a time when few of the
lesser-developed nations even existed and, if they had existed, they would
have lacked the economic and technological development necessary for
meaningful input into the creation of such custom and usage. These na-
tions are being asked to follow international law in which they had little
or no input in creating. It should therefore come as no surprise that the
lesser-developed nations want to fashion new rules, such as stretching the
concept of sovereignty to encompass information about their resources;
154 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 578.
155 SPACE PoLIcY, supra note 3, at 206-07. An example of this fear of dissemination of
damaging information would be the use of agricultural data concerning crop failures by
foreign firms in order to place themselves in a better bargaining position when dealing with
the sensed state. This fear of exploitation, combined with its paranoia regarding strategic
information (which is already undoubtedly recorded by "spy satellites" not subject to the
COPUOS Proposals) is a likely explanation for the position of the USSR.
25 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 579.
J1 . KAY, supra note 16, at 93.
158 Christol, supra note 25, at 394.
119 See J. KAY, supra note 16, at 125, n.237.
160 See Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 583-84.
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nor should it surprise anyone that many nations believe that open dis-
semination invites exploitation.1 61 These fears can only be enhanced by
the Reagan Administration's recent proposal to have the U.S. Landsat
system turned over to non-governmental entities for private commercial
exploitation. 16 2
The developing countries thus find themselves in a political and legal
dilemma: While they feel compelled to protect themselves by endorsing
restrictions on dissemination, they also stand to profit enormously from
unfettered remote sensing and the data it yields. 6 s It is clear, however,
that the developing countries lack the facilities to conduct their own op-
erations in the near future,114 and are thus forced to rely on those states
with present remote sensing capabilities. The real question seems to be
who will be the primary beneficiaries of the growth and development cer-
tain to result from the future application of remote sensing-the -develop-
ing countries, which desire the technology, or those countries already in a
position to exploit advanced technologies such as remote sensing. If the
latter monopolize remote sensing technology and regulation, despite the
generally recognized need for international cooperation in these areas, 1 5
they will have little incentive to share their technology and information,
and the developing countries' opportunity to benefit meaningfully from
remote sensing will be lessened considerably. Furthermore, the Third
World's perception of the more developed nations as greedy and exploi-
tive will be reinforced, and the chasm between the two groups will be
widened.
It can be argued that an open dissemination policy would counteract
this self-centered image and fears of exploitation held by the lesser-devel-
oped nations. However, discussion in the Legal Subcommittee in recent
181 The concern of developing nations regarding exploitation of their natural resources
by others, as well as their desire to have greatly increased input in the creation of interna-
tional law is emphasized in such documents as The United Nations General Assembly Dec-
laration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3021, re-
printed in 68 Am. J. INr'L L. 798 (1974); Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries,
Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Co-operation, and Democratisation of Interna-
tional Relations, U.N. Note Verbale NV/209 of November 12, 1970, reprinted in 10 Int'l
Leg. Materials 215.
162 See UNISPACE 82 Brazil Position Paper, U.N. Doc. AIConf./101/NP/43 (1981). See
also note 184, infra.
1 8 Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 579.
164 The developed countries of the world have 95% of the world's research and develop-
ment capacity for science and technology, while the lesser developed countries, with 70% of
the world's population, have only 5% of the research and development capacity. See U.N.
Doc. A/Conf./101/PC/L.17.
165 See, e.g., COPUOS Draft Principles 11, IV, VI, VII, at Annex I, 7-8 of 1981 Legal
Subcommittee Report, supra note 66; Articles IX, X, XI of 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 31.
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years suggests otherwise, and the Third World remains fearful of open
dissemination.
The inability of the world community to reach a workable consensus
on the third party access issue has significant implications for the future
of a regime for remote sensing. Resolution of the issue would pave the
way for consensus on the remaining Principles. Therefore, it is imperative
that the issue be resolved as quickly as possible. As long as the two op-
posing viewpoints remain blind to reality, resolution seems unlikely.
The open dissemination viewpoint is unrealistic because it fails to
address the lesser-developed countries' fears of exploitation. Proponents
of open dissemination argue that a state may protect itself simply by en-
acting domestic legislation limiting access to resources.' This response
does not take into account problems resulting from dissemination of pri-
mary data or analyzed information which pertains to internal matters
that are beyond control of the sovereign state, whether by domestic legis-
lation, or any other means. As a rule, this data and information has been
unavailable to third parties until the advent of remote sensing.16 7 In a
similar vein, proponents of a consent regime seem to ignore the fact that
by virtue of its sovereignty, a state has absolute and total control over
access to natural resources located within its boundaries. s6 8
It can be seen, then, that the arguments advanced by both sides on
, Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 581.
167 Thus, while a state may be able to keep foreign entities from coming in without
consent and removing such resources as minerals, either through domestic regulation and
legislation or through more drastic means such as expropriation of foreign entities already
operating within the sensed state, the same state has no comparable control over the fact
that it has suffered a major crop failure in a given year. An open dissemination policy would
enable the extent of the crop failure to be disseminated throughout the world, and there
seems to be legitimate basis for fear that foreign merchants would use this information to
the disadvantage of the sensed state, using the data as a means to speculate in international
markets.
1" See J. KAY, supra note 16, at 5. Kay argues that since information pertaining to
natural resources is not an element of the exercise of a state's permanent sovereignty over
natural resources as defined in the various U.N. resolutions addressing the subject, the exer-
cise of sovereign rights to use and disposal of these resources cannot be understood to mean
that international economic competition is no longer legally valid. Kay states that to say
sovereign states must not use the economic tools at their disposal to maximize the benefits
obtainable through world trade denies, rather than affirms a state's sovereign rights to use
and dispose of natural resources. J. KAY, supra note 16, at 13-16. Whatever foundation this
argument may have in classical international law, it is clear that the lesser developed coun-
tries are not interested in buying the more developed nations' version of classical interna-
tional law in its entirety. In light of their fears of the economic damage capable of being
visited upon them, it would seem very unlikely that the third world nations would abide by
the proposition advanced by Kay favoring an open dissemination regime, regardless of its
foundations. In the search for a solution to the third party access question, it would seem
essential to focus on the realities of the present, rather than on traditional international
legal theory having little or no relevance to the needs and concerns of developing countries.
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the problem of exploitation prove too much. Nonetheless, viewing the is-
sue from this perspective lays the groundwork for a potential solution.
IV. TOWARD A SOLUTION
A deadlock clearly remains in the COPUOS debate on the third
party access question.16 ' Certainly, there have been attempts at compro-
mise. Notable among these are the Soviet proposal utilizing resolution as
the classification criterion and the Colombian proposal barring dissemina-
tion of data and information pertaining to "agricultural crops" without
consent. However, these proposals have not moved the Legal Subcommit-
tee any closer to consensus.
While the legal deadlock continues, there has been progress in the
technological realm. Although the U.S. Landsat system is experimental, 170
the French SPOT is close to being operational 171 Already, concern has
been voiced about the possibility that the French SPOT System's high
resolution may provide users with too much information,1 72 and agree-
ments restricting dissemination of SPOT data may be necessary to pre-
vent opposition from a number of states.173 While Spotimage, the joint
government-industry organization set up to market SPOT services, has
announced its willingness to abide by international regulations regarding
data dissemination, 74 the fact that such agreements may be required em-
phasizes the need for achieving international consensus on the question of
dissemination as quickly as possible. 75 In addition to technological ad-
vances, new legal questions are being created as well. 17 s It is thus impera-
tive that the third party access question be resolved.
Several stumbling blocks remain in the way of consensus. They stem
1"' An examination of any of the Legal Subcommittee Reports, supra note 66, will ver-
ify this.
170 Leigh, United States Policy of Collecting and Disseminating Remote Sensing Data,
in Matte & DeSaussure, supra note 1, at 148.
" See, e.g., supra note 145, and accompanying text.
172 SPACE PoLIcy, supra note 3, at 190.
173 Id.
174 Id.
173 Chaos would become inevitable if a special set of agreements were needed to be
reached each time a new operational remote sensing system was put into use. Since there
are expected to be at least six operational remote sensing systems in operation by the end of
the decade, this underscores the need for consensus on the third party access question. See
UNISPACE 82 Report, supra note 10, at 24.
176 For example, when the French Spot system becomes operational (see supra note
146), another state which possesses a receiving station and receives data pertaining to its
neighbor becomes a third party within the meaning of COPUOS Draft Principle XV and the
respective provisions of the Argentina/Brazil and France/USSR Proposals. See Hosenball,
Free Acquisition and Dissemination of Data through Remote Sensing, in Matte & DeSaus-
sure, supra note 1, at 111.
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primarily from the unrealistic premises in the arguments advanced by the
proponents of the two viewpoints previously discussed.
A. Stumbling Blocks-Open Dissemination View
The open dissemination view espoused by the United States can
trace its roots back to basic democratic ideals of freedom177 which were
extended into the realm of space activities by the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 195878 and the United States' interpretation of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty.179 This is all well and good from the United
States' point of view, but not from the perspective of the lesser-developed
countries. It is easy for the latter to conceive of this view as a convenient
justification for the United States to expand its technological leadership,
while generating substantial economic and political benefits and keeping
other nations dependent on U.S. data, as well as subject to U.S. views
regarding the use and dissemination of that data. There is no doubt that
the United States desires to continue reaping the benefits of its advanced
technology.180 In addition, it is obvious that if the United States retains a
measure of control over the allocation of earth resource data services, it
will be able to use such control as a means of advancing other foreign
policy interests.1 81
The same reasoning applies to foreign trade as well. The United
States and other highly developed countries are interested in expanding
exports, and by promoting the international sale of data receiving and
processing equipment for earth resources sensing, the balance of pay-
ments for the exporters will improve."" In addition, the U.S. Government
probably also intends to use remote sensing as a tool to develop previ-
ously underdeveloped food and mineral resources in order to increase the
supply and decrease the price of world raw materials. This would en-
courage other states to use revenues from their increased volume of ex-
ports to increase their imports, particularly from the United States.'
With this attitude looming in the background, the lesser-developed
countries' fears of exploitation do not seem so unrealistic. These fears of
exploitation and abuse are only buttressed by the plans of highly devel-
177 See Galloway, Remote Sensing from Outer Space: Legal Implications of Worldwide
Utilization and Dissemination of Data, in Matte & DeSaussure, supra note 1, at 97.
178 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1976).
178 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
:8o SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42, at 300.
181 Id. at 301. This would seem to hold true even if Landsat is commercialized. Commu-
nications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) is one of the leading candidates to take over
Landsat, and since its inception has worked closely with the U.S. government. COMSAT, it
should be noted, is a government-created corporation.
182 SPACE INDUSTRLALIZATION, supra note 42, at 299.
83 Id.
Vol. 15:361
oped countries such as the United States and France for the commerciali-
zation of remote sensing operations.1' In addition, commercialization
plans trigger another fear of the lesser-developed countries: concern for
the continued availability of data.185 There is no assurance that Landsat
operations will be continued on a medium or long term basis, 88 with or
without commercialization. Thus, assuming that the U.S. remote sensing
program remains intact in one form or another, an open dissemination
policy, coupled with plans for commercialization, raises the spectre of a
world data and analyzed information regime controlled by profit-oriented
corporations whose goals may be inimical to the goals of many lesser-
developed countries.1 87
In response to these fears of exploitation, states may control physical
access to resources through domestic legislation. s8  However, as was ear-
lier discussed, this view ignores the fact that some disseminated data may
pertain to matters which, though within the sensed states' jurisdiction,
cannot be controlled through domestic legislation.
B. Stumbling Blocks-Consent View
There are counter-arguments to the justifications advanced in sup-
port of a consent requirement. As previously discussed, many fears of the
lesser-developed countries concerning economic exploitation are rendered
moot by domestic legislation regulating access to natural resources. It is
also true that to date, no nation has actually shown harm resulting from
the dissemination of sensing data to a third party.189 In addition, it has
been powerfully argued that the prior consent regime for dissemination
has no basis in classical international law,190 and that by extending sover-
eignty to encompass information about resources, sensing nations are be-
ing denied the use of economic tools at their disposal, thus infringing on
the sensing state's sovereignty. 9
However, no amount of legal reasoning will excuse hundreds of years
' See, e.g., Brazilian Position Paper, UNISPACE 82, supra note 162. The United
States has adopted a policy favoring commercialization of the Landsat program as soon as is
reasonably practicable. See SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 222. The Reagan Administration
has recently announced its intention to sell the Landsat system to the private sector. See
THE WASHINGTON POST, March 8, 1983, at Al.
111 UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 51. There is concern that since NASA policy is
unilateral, it is subject to unilateral alteration. See SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42,
at 297.
8"6 SPACE INDUSTRALIzATIoN, supra note 42, at 297.
187 See Ambrosetti, supra note 1, at 578.
188 Id. at 581.
189 Hosenball, supra note 176, at 111.
190 See generally J. KAY, supra note 16, at 1-22.
1,1 Id. at 16.
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of exploitation of lesser-developed countries. Political realities and differ-
ing views must be taken into account, even if they seem unrealistic or
exaggerated. The economic danger of information concerning a poor food
crop in one nation being disseminated throughout the world to other na-
tions in a position to benefit economically from the impending shortage is
very real to the nation being sensed. Controlling these consequences is a
burden which sensed nations have never before had to face. In addition,
while it is arguable that the attempt of some proponents of a consent
regime to extend principles of sovereignty to encompass data and infor-
mation about natural resources as well as the resources themselves is an
attempt to enforce domestic law extraterritorially, it can also be argued
that the open dissemination policy is a blatant attempt to enforce the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution extraterritorially. 192 Whether a
state can require consent before information affecting it can be broadcast
into it or disseminated about it is an issue applicable to both remote sens-
ing and Direct Broadcast Satellites and is a very real concern for many
lesser-developed countries as well as the Communist bloc,193 (one that is
not likely to be overcome by relying on classical international legal
theory).
V. CONCLUSION
At present, by operating the world's only functioning remote sensing
system, the United States controls its application and technology. Under
U.S. policy any citizen, as well as any other nation, has access to virtually
all U.S. data collected world-wide. 94 Even if the U.S. Government does
192 There is a great deal of concern among third world nations regarding U.S. attempts
to enforce the First Amendment extraterritorially. Just recently, the United Nations voted
to require the consent of the receiving nation before another nation operates a direct broad-
cast satellite system that broadcasts into the receiving state. Despite the fact that such a
requirement, like the consent requirement proposed for dissemination of remotely-sensed
data, may not have a firm foundation in classical international law, a majority of member
nations have approved the requirement. The result of this adoption will probably impact
upon the COPUOS discussions on remote sensing. One delegate was quoted after the UN
vote as saying: "We're not here to negotiate the credo of the U.S. - we're here to deal with
the interests of 157 States." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1982.
'9' SPACE POLICY, supra note 3, at 354. Obviously, remotely sensed data is not as much
of a danger in terms of propaganda as are Direct Broadcast Satellites, because the material
is not directly transmitted to the individual citizens of a nation, and also because the data
and information itself is of questionable value as political propaganda. Nonetheless, it is
significant that the DBS spillover debate, involving the same principle of prior consent
before information may be transmitted, has been the subject of long drawn-out debate, and
seems to be leading to adoption of a prior consent requirement despite continuous U.S.
opposition. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
"9 SPACE INDUSTRIALIZATION, supra note 42, at 294; see generally, Robinson, For a
Worldwide Uilization and Dissemination of Data Acquired Through Remote Sensing, in
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not provide it to other nations directly, U.S. citizens may disseminate it
anywhere. The United States must be prepared to modify this policy. To
resolve the third party access issue and to enable genuine large scale in-
ternational cooperation and its concurrent benefits, such as sharing of
costs and technology, the United States must be willing to accept present
political and economic reality. The United States must be prepared to
adjust its admirably principled position to reflect, at least in part, the
views of the rest of the world; particularly the views of the lesser-devel-
oped nations. This is most certainly true if the United States expects the
rest of the world to share in the costs of perfecting and applying remote
sensing technology.
The solution 19 5 to the third party access question should be sought in
a compromise of the current positions. The right to disseminate data
should depend upon whether a sensed state has the ability to control the
consequences resulting from dissemination of the data to third parties.
Thus, data pertaining to natural resources could be freely disseminatable
since the sensed state, through domestic legislation or other means, could
control physical access to the resources. Data pertaining to matters over
which the sensed state cannot control the consequences resulting from
dissemination, such as the hypothetical bad wheat crop, could be dissemi-
nated only with the consent of the sensed nation. This approach should
enable the world to reach consensus on the third party access issue, and
by resolving that issue, pave the way for consensus regarding the remain-
ing Principles concerning remote sensing. This solution, by making use of
elements contained in the opposing viewpoints, should prove satisfactory
since it allays fears of exploitation while at the same time it minimizes
restrictions on dissemination. While this proposal would not permit open
dissemination of all data, it would allow for the dissemination of a great
deal of data. To the extent that consent would be required, it could be in
areas where there are realistic and legitimate reasons for concern. This is
the basis for a sound, realistic and workable compromise.
Unlike the Soviet resolution-based criterion, this compromise would
not be rendered unworkable or obsolete by changes in technology.196 Ad-
Matte & DeSaussure, supra note 1, at 113-124.
" While it might be possible through the use of international trade, negotiation, for-
eign aid and other non-aggressive sanctions to convince an individual state to consent to
third party dissemination of data pertaining to it, such a solution does not dispose of the
legal issues underlying the problem.
1" It is submitted that the proposal for a dissemination standard based upon spatial
resolution, supra note 112, if adopted, would stifle technological and economic development
as a result of limiting the "useful resolution" of international remote sensing operations.
The solution proposed in this Note would enable the benefits of future advancements in
sensing and data processing to be incorporated into remote sensing programs as quickly as
they can develop.
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mittedly, working out a regulatory regime to implement this proposal is
bound to be time-consuming. However, if COPUOS started to work now
on such a scheme, perhaps using the Colombian proposal 97 as a starting
point, it would certainly reach consensus long before the current debate
finds any acceptable solution.
Although the discussions of the proposal will take time, the United
States could advance the process by voluntarily modifying its open dis-
semination position. This action should pave the way for conciliation and
cooperation in the implementation of remote sensing systems in a more
timely fashion than if the current devisive debate continues. If indeed it
is true that world opinion is starting to swing in favor of open dissemina-
tion,19 s any current proposal may ultimately be subsumed by a regime
based on open dissemination. In the meantime, the regulatory regime will
have at least been keeping pace with the technological development and
the implementation of new, operational remote sensing systems, a situa-
tion otherwise unlikely to occur given the current rate of progress on the
proposals now before the Legal Subcommittee. The mere fact that the
United States would be willing to move from its absolute open dissemina-
tion position would show the rest of the world U.S. willingness to take
into account other nations' concerns and would help allay fears of ex-
ploitation. This would open the door to the increased international coop-
eration and assistance that all nations profess to be desirable. L99 In con-
junction with the solution of the third party access question, this
approach could lay the foundation for an international remote sensing
regime.200 An international regime, in turn would reduce Third World
19. W/G/RS (1981) WP.1, contained in 1981 Legal Subcommittee Report, supra note
66.
198 See generally Note, In Search of a Legal Framework for the Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space, 4 B. C. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 453 (1981).
199 See generally COPUOS Draft Principles, supra note 18; 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 31; UNISPACE 82 Report, supra note 10.
200 Because of the transnational nature of remote sensing, there is no way that an inter-
national remote sensing regime can become operational until the third party access question
is resolved. Once agreement is reached, any one of a range of proposed regimes could be
implemented. Several practical considerations, including a concern for continuity of data,
compatibility of systems, unnecessary duplication, and international cooperation and techni-
cal assistance point toward an international regime handling both the ground and space
segments.
As regards the space segment, cost and unnecessary duplication render national systems
impractical, and thus discussion has centered upon models in which the space segment is
operated cooperatively, either on a regional or worldwide basis.
Discussion of models for the ground segment has centered upon the following options:
(1) national stations, comparable to the existing pattern of relationships based upon bilat-
eral agreements that the United States, as owner of the space segment, has with countries
wishing to establish national receiving stations; (2) regional stations serving several nations;
and, (3) an international system consisting of either a specialized agency coordinating proce-
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concerns relating to continued data availability at reasonable prices and
compatibility of ground segment equipment. 01 The policy of free dissemi-
nation would be retained to the extent that it is compatible with the con-
cerns of developing nations, while providing all nations with basic infor-
mation pertaining to natural resources and the environment. As a result,
the impediments to an international operational remote sensing system
would be reduced, and the entire planet would stand ready to benefit
from the incredible potential of remote sensing.
Since it is the moving force behind the open dissemination viewpoint,
the United States would similarly be in a unique position to spearhead
the drive toward compromise, minimizing opposition from the other pro-
ponents of open dissemination and enhancing the potential for consensus.
The United States need not continue its policy of open dissemination if
those who are intended to benefit from the policy do not want it.2 °2 The
United States gains little from doing so, because instead of demonstrating
the benefits of remote sensing, a forced open dissemination policy will
dures, formats and dissemination, or a network of receiving stations and distribution sta-
tions managed by an international body. Such an international organization could be within
or without the framework of the United Nations.
Regional stations have the advantage over national stations of sharing cost and encour-
aging cooperation, as well as giving participating nations a voice in deciding the extent and
nature of the program. Regional stations have been advocated by many (see, e.g., J. KAY,
supra note 16; Ambrosetti, supra note 1). In addition, it has been pointed out that regional
centers may be less sensitive to the factionalism that frequently arises in international
bodies.
There has been much discussion of an international organization operating a ground
system under the auspices of the United Nations (see generally U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/1/8 Ch.
IV (1973)) as well as discussion of an international body not necessarily under the umbrella
of the United Nations, modeled after INTELSAT. Such an international system, presuma-
bly also operating the space segment, has the potential of offering efficient, uniform world-
wide coverage with the greatest opportunity for international cooperation. The United
States would, of course, have to sacrifice its present open dissemination policy for such an
organization to be viable, but the basic concern of the United States that there be open
access via satellite systems to collect data would remain unimpeded.
Any one of these systems could be compatible with the solution proposed in this Note.
For discussion of a workable model of an international remote sensing organization modeled
after INTELSAT, see the discussion in SPACE PoLIcY, supra note 3, at 298-300. The model
discussed therein uses a criterion based upon spatial resolution, but the dissemination stan-
dard proposed in this Note could be substituted easily without the inherent drawbacks of
the spatial resolution standard.
20 UNISPACE 82, supra note 10, at 51, 67-68. While there is no guarantee of contin-
ued data availability from an international regime, it would seem that such a regime, with
broad user and national support would have a greater commitment to continuity than would
a single U.S. supplier, be it a commercial or governmental entity. See SPACE POLICY, supra
note 3, at 300.
202 See, e.g., luncheon remarks of A.W. Frutkin at Earth Resources Survey Symposium,
Houston, Texas, June 11, 1975, cited in Robinson, supra note 194, at 122.
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simply be viewed by Third World nations as a violation of their sover-
eignty. Thus, abandoning absolute open dissemination is the first step in
actually reaching consensus on the third party access question.
The second step in solving the question is the adoption of a dissemi-
nation criterion based on the sensed state's ability to control the conse-
quences resulting from dissemination to third parties. Once consensus ex-
ists, all that remains is to formulate a workable construction of that
standard. At first glance, this seems nearly impossible, since getting the
members of COPUOS to agree on a single specific standard would entail
many more years of prolonged debate. However, once a general consensus
exists, there is no need for unanimity on a specific standard. The "specif-
ics" of what types of data may be disseminated could be negotiated be-
tween the sensing entities, (states, corporations or international consor-
tia), °0 and the sensed states in a series of bilateral agreements. This
process would allow for the negotiation of a standard within the limits of
the general consensus discussed above for each individual nation. This
would give the sensed states some measure of control over the data ob-
tained over their sovereign territory. In addition, this plan is not overly
dependent on international custom or domination by the developed coun-
tries, and hence should not be objectionable on those grounds. In effect, it
would elevate developing nations to a relatively better bargaining position
vis-i-vis the developed nations. The agreements could be subject to re-
view and amendment at predetermined intervals to adapt to changing po-
litical, economic and technological realities.
This proposal for achieving resolution of the question of third party
access should be effective; it removes the fallacious elements of the op-
posing arguments and focuses upon the realistic concerns expressed by
those on different sides of the issue embodied in those arguments. Reso-
lution of the third party access issue should be greatly hastened. Once
this issue is resolved, general international agreement regarding the Draft
Principles on Remote Sensing presently under consideration by COPUOS
should be accomplished with minimal delay.2" The foundation will have
been laid for a regime that will enable the application and regulation of
operational remote sensing systems to keep up with technological, politi-
cal and economic development. The resulting benefits from this "new in-
formation process" 2°5 will inure to all nations of this planet as well as to
the planet itself.
103 See supra note 200; model discussed in SPACE PoLicy, supra note 3, at 298-300.
"'0 For discussion of the importance of the dissemination issue, see J. KAY, supra note
16.
205 Ambrosetti, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX*
TEXTS OF DRAFT PRINCIPLES AS CONTAINED IN THE
REPORT OF THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF
ITS TWENTIETH SESSION (A/AC. 105/288], ANNEX I,
APPENDIX)
Principle P
For the purpose of these principles with respect to remote sensing of
the natural resources of the earth and its environment: 2
(a) The term "remote sensing of the earth" means "remote sensing of
the natural resources of the earth and its environment".3
(b) The term "primary data" means those primary data which are
acquired by satellite-borne remote sensors and transmitted from a satel-
lite either by telemetry in the form of electromagnetic signals or physi-
cally in any form such as photographic film or magnetic tape, as well as
preprocessed products derived from those data which may be used for
later analysis.
(c) The term "analysed information'"4 means the end-product result-
ing from the analytical process performed on the primary data as defined
in paragraph (b) above combined with data and/or knowledge obtained
from sources other than satellite-borne remote sensors.
Principle II
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space and international co-
operation in that field [shall] [should] be carried out for the benefit and
in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and taking into consideration, in international co-
operation, the particular needs of the developing countries.
Principle III
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space [shall] [should] be con-
* [Author's Note: The numbering of the footnotes has been altered slightly from how
they appeared in the original in order to conform to the style of this publication. The con-
tent and substance remain unchanged.]
' The question of the application of these principles to international intergovernmental
organizations will be considered later.
2 The formulation "with respect to remote sensing of the natural resources of the earth
and its environment" will be reviewed in light of the title to be given to the principles.
3 This term is still subject to further discussion. In the view of some delegations, it
would be necessary in the future work to further define the meaning of the words "remote
sensing of the earth and its environment".
4The content, definition and necessity of the term "analysed information" is still to be
clarified.
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ducted in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, and the relevant instruments of ITU.
Principle IV
1. States carrying out programmes for remote sensing of the earth from
outer space [should] [shall] promote international co-operation in these
programmes. To this end, sensing States [should] [shall] make available
to other States opportunities for participation in these programmes. Such
participation should be based in each case on equitable and mutually ac-
ceptable terms due regard being paid to principles.
2. In order to maximize the availability of benefits from such remote sens-
ing data, States are encouraged to consider agreements for the establish-
ment of shared regional facilities.
Principle V
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space [should] [shall] pro-
mote the protection of the natural environment of the earth. To this end
States participating in remote sensing [should] [shall] identify and make
available information useful for prevention of phenomena detrimental to
the natural environment of the earth.
Principle VI
States participating in remote sensing of the earth from outer space
[should] [shall] make available technical assistance to other interested
States on mutually agreed terms.
Principle VII
1. The United Nations and the relevant agencies within the United Na-
tions system should promote international co-operation, including techni-
cal assistance, and play a role of co-ordination in the area of remote sens-
ing of the earth.
2. States conducting activities in the field of remote sensing of the earth
[shall] [should] notify the Secretary-General thereof, in compliance with
article XI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies.
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Principle VIII
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space should promote the
protection of mankind from natural disaster.5 To this end, States which
have identified primary data from remote sensing of the earth and/or
analysed information in their possession which would be useful in helping
to alert States to impending natural disasters, or in assisting States to
deal with natural disasters should, as promptly as possible, notify those
States affected or likely to be affected of the existence and availability of
such data and/or information. Such data and/or information should, upon
request, be disseminated as promptly as possible.
Principle IX 6
Taking into account the principles II and III above, remote sensing
data or information derived therefrom [shall] [should] be used by States
in a manner compatible with the legitimate rights and interests of other
States. 7
Principle X
States participating in remote sensing of the earth either directly or
through relevant international organization [shall] [should] be prepared
to make available to the United Nations and other interested States, par-
ticularly the developing countries, upon their request, any relevant tech-
nical information involving possible operational systems which they are
free to disclose.
Principle XI
[States [shall] [should] bear international responsibility for [na-
tional] activities of remote sensing of the earth [irrespective of whether]
[where] such activities are carried out by governmental [or-non-govern-
mental] entities, and [shall] [should] [guarantee that such activities will]
comply with the provisions of these principles.]
5 The meaning of this term is subject to further discussion.
6 Should be considered in connexion with the formulation of a principle on dissemina-
tion of data or information and subject to later discussion of the terms "information" and
"data."
I Some delegations were of the view that, for the sake of consistency it was necessary to
consider this principle in the light of draft principle H and III.
A delegation reserved its position on removing the square brackets around the words
"in a manner compatible with" and on the deletion of the words "not" and "to the detri-
ment of."
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Principle XII
A sensed State [shall] [should] have timely and non-discriminating
access to primary data obtained by remote sensing of the earth from
outer space, concerning its territory, on [agreed] reasonable terms and [no
later than] [before] access is granted to any third State.' [To the greatest
extent feasible and practicable, this principle shall also apply to analysed
information.]
Principle XIII
[A State [intending to conduct] [conducting] remote sensing activi-
ties of the earth from outer space shall notify the Secretary-General of
the United Nations and [upon request] the States whose territory is in-
tended to be covered by such activities [to the fullest extent feasible and
as soon as practicable] of the intended launch, [nature of the] mission,
duration and coverage of such activities. The Secretary-General shall
publish information thus received.]
Principle XIV
[A State carrying out remote sensing of the earth [shall] [should]
without delay consult with a State whose territory is sensed upon request
of the latter in regard to such activity, [in particular dissemination of
data and information,] in order to promote international co-operation,
friendly relations among States and to enhance the mutual benefits to be
derived from this activity.]
Principle XV
[States carrying out remote sensing of the earth shall not, without
the approval of the States whose territories are affected by these activi-
ties, disseminate or dispose of any data or information on the natural
resources of these States to third States, international organizations, pub-
lic or private entities.]
Principle XVI
[Without prejudice to the principle of the freedom of exploration and
use of outer space, as set forth in Article I of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, remote sensing of
8 The question of from which States access to and provision of data should be obtained
needs further consideration, subject to review in the light of the discussion on access by
third States.
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the earth [should] [shall] be conducted with respect for the principle of
full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own
wealth and natural resources [with due regard to the rights and interests
of other States and their natural and juridical persons in accordance with
international law] [as well as their inalienable right to dispose of their
natural resources] [and of information concerning those resources].]
Principle XVII
[Any dispute that may arise with respect to the application of [Activ-
ities covered by] these principles [shall] [should] be resolved by prompt
consultations among the parties to the dispute. Where a mutually accept-
able solution cannot be found by such consultations it [shall] [should] be
sought through other [established] [existing] procedures for the peaceful
means of settlement of disputes mutually agreed upon by the parties
concerned.] 9
" Subject to review in the light of the full set of agreed principles and a decision on the
legal nature of the principles.
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